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n Tetrachordon, Milton resoundingly rejects as “crabbed” Augustine’s opinion 
“that manly friendship in all other regards had bin a more becoming solace 
for Adam, then to spend so many secret years in an empty world with one 
woman” (1032-33).1 The relationship of husband and wife, Milton explains 
(echoing other Protestant writers on marriage), affords more “peculiar comfort[s]” 
of “company” than those of “the genial bed”: “in no company so well as where 
the differente sexe in most resembling unlikeness, and most unlike resemblance 
cannot but please best and be pleas’d in the aptitude of that variety” (1033).2 The 
chiasmus of “most resembling unlikeness, and most unlike resemblance” locates 
the frictions of sexual difference at the center of marital desire and its satisfactions. 
Yet when Adam, in Paradise Lost, asks God for “fellowship . . . / . . . fit to 
participate / All rational delight” (8.389-91), does he expect God to create another 
man?3 Adam’s citation of the “Lion with Lioness” (8.393) as one of creation’s fit 
“pairs” (8.394) suggests that he understands his “ human consort” (8.392) will be 
female – a being whom he, asleep, sees God fashion as “Manlike, but different 
sex” (8.471). Feminist criticism of Milton’s epic has nonetheless differed sharply 
over whether God actually delivers the being for which Adam tells Raphael he 
asked, and the being that Adam claims God promised: “Thy likeness, thy fit help, 
thy other self, / Thy wish exactly to thy hearts desire” (8.450-51, emphasis added).  
Rehearsing the many conclusions of both prosecutorial and apologetic 
readings of Milton’s Eve is not necessary, I hope, to make the queer suggestion 
that Adam’s request for companionship stems from a desire audible as 
homoerotic.4 Adam articulates his request for a companion in the discourse of 
friendship, classically understood as a same-sex relationship among social and 
intellectual equals.5 Seeking “Collateral love, and dearest amitie” (8.425), he asks 
God, “Among unequals what societie / Can sort, what harmonie or true delight” 
(8.383-84)? He stresses sameness as he asks God to grant him “Like of his like” 
(8.423), a copy of himself with whom he can make other copies. He says nothing 
about the lioness’s subordination or inferiority to, or otherwise meaningful 
difference from, the lion. Recalling for the reader Eve’s poolside education in the 
difference between Adam and her reflection in the water – a story that begins with 
Eve’s own observation that Adam “Like consort to [him]self canst no where find” 
(4.448) – Adam asks for another version of himself whose degree of difference 
thereafter becomes a subject of his education. The fact that Adam tells this story 
to Raphael, whose company Adam admits to relishing (8.210-16), and once Eve 








negotiating sexual difference both prompt and retroject his wish for friendship. 
Riven by his understanding of himself as, as well as his current desire to be, Eve’s 
superior, and, as he subsequently confesses, by his companionate but conflicting 
sense that Eve “so absolute . . . seems / And in her self compleat” (8.547-48), 
Adam (one historian among many in the poem) arguably reconstructs his initial 
desire for a consort as a desire ignorant of the difference sexual difference makes. 
Worries over the relationship between subordination and inferiority, over degrees 
of similitude among humans, are symptomatically absent in Adam’s “initial” 
request for another version of himself: a homo.  
Here at the outset of several essays that collectively seek to justify – that 
is, to make a case for the critical rightness of while simultaneously producing – 
queer readings of Milton’s work, I would like to suggest that Milton’s most famous 
effort, Paradise Lost, raises but does not foreclose a set of queer possibilities for the 
sexual “orientations” of Adam and Eve. I intend this suggestion as part of my own 
brief, introductory take on the relative paucity of queer criticism about a poet who 
focuses his epic-to-end-all-epics on the story of the first “heterosexual” couple 
(Adam and Eve, not Adam and Steve), but who endows each partner with 
palpable, entirely extra-Biblical homoerotic longing. Certainly this critical paucity 
has much to do with what Drew Daniel describes in his contribution as the 
conservative “tenor of Milton scholarship,” with its “constitutive anxiety about 
‘ruining the sacred truths’ and [its] vexed awareness of the watchful paternal gaze 
of an authorial super-ego.” Howsoever patriarchal, Milton’s championship of 
companionate, heterosexual marriage in the divorce tracts and Paradise Lost ranks 
high among these sacred truths threatened by any queer outing of Adam and Eve 
as homosexuals. At the risk of ruination, I would nonetheless like to proceed with 
the possibility that Adam and Eve are not in fact heterosexuals, if by that 
anachronistic term we mean people whose desire tends primarily toward the 
“opposite” sex.6  
Alternative possibilities for Adam and Eve’s sexual orientations 
consolidate in the poem under the sign of the homo. For modern readers, this sign 
includes the homosexual as an equally anachronistic designation for a person 
whose sexual desire tends primarily toward members of the same sex. As I derive 
the expanded term from Leo Bersani, however, homoeroticism also marks an 
erotic orientation toward sameness, including self-sameness, or the appearance of 
being without a constitutive lack healed only in a dyadic relationship.7 Adam’s 
attraction to Raphael, who admits to no crippling sense of self-alienation, provides 
one example of such homoerotic attraction, as does Adam’s attraction to 
(expressed as awe of) God as “One” (8.421) without “deficience found”(8.416). 
Doubtless the most critically discussed example of homoeroticism in the poem is 
Eve’s attraction to the aquatic reflection of herself that she does not know lacks 
the “depth” that now so ubiquitously metaphorizes subjectivity. But another 
example of the same homoerotic orientation is Adam’s otherwise heterosexual 
perception of Eve as “in her self compleat.” Raphael’s reply to this confession 
with a lecture on male self-esteem entirely misses the point that Adam has been 
trying to make to this comparatively self-complete “man” about human deficiency 






not fit to, Eve has not satisfied Adam’s doubly homoerotic and contradictory 
desires: for an equal to “solace his defects” (8.419) and for a companion who is 
not defective.  
Persistently frustrating Adam and Eve’s homoerotic desires in Paradise 
Lost is a Neoplatonic ontology of the human as constitutionally incomplete, 
divided in half with the other half to be found across a sexual divide that is also a 
slope. In the form of “one flesh” heterosexual sociality that Adam and Eve should 
model according to, among others, Adam himself, each lacks the companionship 
of the other with whom each also exists in a hierarchal relationship. Adam and 
Eve are each other’s “other half “ (4.488), in Adam’s words, and he is “her Head” 
(8.574), in Raphael’s.8 As Bersani argues, however, homoeroticism contains within 
it a “potentially revolutionary inaptitude . . . for sociality as it is known.”9 If, from 
the prosecutorial perspective on Eve, the Son most concisely articulates sociality 
as it is known in Paradise Lost when he tells Adam that “God set thee above her 
made of thee / And for thee, whose perfection farr excell’d / Hers in all real 
dignitie” (10.148-51), then the homoerotic desires Adam and Eve nevertheless 
articulate mark the first couple’s potentially revolutionary inaptitude for a divinely 
prescribed heterosocial life. These desires suggest that like Bersani’s homos, Adam 
and Eve might, even before the fall and without falling (an event that hinges only 
and always only on violating that “One easie prohibition” [4.433] against eating 
from the Tree of Life), make “the politically unacceptable and politically 
indispensible choice of an outlaw existence.”10 
Let us speculate – for what is the poem itself if not a grand act of 
speculation, one that repeatedly calls attention to its own speculative status?11 An 
Adam and Eve who never turn themselves into the law might never become a 
couple. An outlaw Adam might still long for the “fellowship” God reportedly 
promised but never delivered. Or – a conjunction that, in Miltonic contexts, as 
Peter Herman has taught us, also carries the sense of and – he might refuse the 
misogynistic construction of Eve as his inferior.12 An outlaw Eve might refuse to 
frame retroactively her first experience of desire as narcissistically “vain” (4.466). 
Her desire might tend more toward what we now call lesbianism, if not, even more 
so than the lonely Adam’s, toward autoerotism. After all, Eve’s account of learning 
how “beauty is excelld by manly grace / And wisdom, which alone is truly fair” 
(4.490-91) testifies not to her successful conversion away from an image she must 
be told “is thy self” (4.468), but instead to the failure of that conversion. Eve is so 
scarcely convinced by the lesson about proper image reflection and other halves 
that she feels compelled to rehearse it in all its painful detail. These details include 
her initial turning away from Adam and back toward the pool. They include 
Adam’s proprietary interpellation of her as an individual – not one-in-one but half-
in-one – part of himself: “Henceforth an individual solace dear; / Part of my Soul 
I seek thee, and thee claim / My other half” (4.486-88). And they include Adam’s 
supplementation of his proprietary claim with taming force: his “gentle hand / 
Seisd” hers (4.488-89, emphasis added). Given that Eve’s story of sexual 
conversion makes up the bulk of her very first speech in the poem, one might 
wonder how often she tells it. How much time has passed since she “yielded” 







have to pass before she no longer feels the need to rehearse this lesson? How long 
before her outlaw desire will so succumb to the law of manly grace’s superiority 
to female beauty that the desire itself will disappear and the law itself will need no 
articulation?  
We know that Satan recognizes the incompleteness of Eve’s 
heterosocialization because he tempts her with the promise that by eating from a 
tree he slyly tropes as the feminine “Mother of Science” (9.680), she too will 
possess the cognitive faculties necessary “not onely to discerne / Things in thir 
Causes, but to trace the wayes / Of highest Agents, deemd however wise” (9.681- 
83). In other words, she will be “fit to participate / All rational delight” with Adam, 
and then some. The possibility that Eve may already be as perfectly fit as Adam, 
and that she is only told otherwise by the misogynists around her, is one point on 
which a queer reading can build on a feminist one. In this queer reading, Satan 
tempts Eve with her persistent homoerotic attraction to a reflection of self that 
she has not been permitted to possess. Although sexual difference remains caught 
in a hierarchical frame, such that Eve will become wiser than Adam, it is both to 
Eve’s queer credit that she succumbs to this temptation and all the more tragic 
that she regrets it. Her temptation evinces that her homoerotic attraction to a self 
undefined by lack retains a psychic priority in her with respect to the hierarchical 
heterosexual relationship she is currently in that degrades her as the inferior 
partner.  
Adam, too, eventually makes an outlaw choice and regrets it. Yet he does 
not predicate his choice on a rejection of the doctrine of other halves he previously 
and literally espoused. Quite the contrary: this doctrine, he feels, compels his 
disobedience:  
 
So forcible within my heart I feel 
The Bond of Nature draw me to my owne, 
My own in thee, for what thou art is mine; 
Our State cannot be severd, we are one, 
One Flesh; to loose thee were to loose my self. (9.955-59)  
 
Confounded in his desire once again, Adam voices the frictional principles of 
marital sameness (“we are one”) and possession (“my owne”), and his fall only 
exacerbates the misogyny entwined in this belief in dyadic self-completion through 
wedded property. In book ten Adam viciously laments that God did not “fill the 
World at once / With Men as Angels without Feminine” (10.892-93). Adam is 
wrong, according to the narrator, about angelic sex. Angels are neither men nor 
women; they “either Sex assume, or both” (1.424). Presuming the narrator is right, 
and that Raphael and Michael serve as angelic spokes“men” on issues of sex and 
gender, the reason all angels assume male form in the poem, however, may well 
have something to do with the angels’ own misogyny. Educating Adam in future 
history, Michael manifests this misogyny somewhat schizophrenically by 
attributing death to “th’ inabstinence of Eve” (11.476) and then turning on Adam 
when Adam, as if trying to repeat the lesson of his teacher, attributes “the tenor 






properly belongs, Michael says, recalling the Son’s claim that Adam “did’st resign 
[his] Manhood” (10.148), to “Mans effeminate slackness . . . / . . . who should 
better hold his place / By wisdome and superiour gifts receav’d” (11.634-36). 
Responsibility for the fall, the reader may gather, lies not with Eve, except when 
it does. And it lies not with Adam, except when it does because he is insufficiently 
manly.  
Perhaps most crucial to any attempt at a summary accounting of Paradise 
Lost’s final word on sexual relationality is the fact that Michael gets his own final 
word about Eve wrong. He instructs Adam to “waken Eve” (12.594), implying 
that she is asleep, but Adam finds her “wak’t” (12.608). If Michael gets this most 
basic of facts wrong, how much more likely is it that, from the skeptical 
perspective the reader may occupy in regards to this highly speculative poem, 
Michael gets his already confused prescription of misogynistic heterosexuality 
wrong too? Moreover, if Michael’s factual wrongs as an angel point upward to 
what many readers, including most recently Peter Herman and Michael Bryson, 
have argued is the poem’s profound unease with its own representation of God, 
how much more likely is it that the doctrine of heterosexual misogyny that 
Raphael, Michael, the Son, Adam, and even Eve preach is entirely fabricated as 
part and parcel of God’s perhaps tyrannical strategy of human subjectivization?13 
How much more likely is it, in short, that the paradise actually lost in the poem is 
one in which Adam and Eve had the chance to decouple sexual difference from 
sexual hierarchy and live their lives as sexual outlaws while still not breaking that 
one easy prohibition, that silly little rule about fruit eating, that is the only hard 
and fast law God has given them – the only law whose violation could get them 






To allow for the possibility that Adam and Eve’s relationship need not have lapsed 
into misogynistic and proprietary heterosexuality, to claim that the poem explores 
the possibility for different outcomes, and sets up the possibility for counterfactual 
histories, is not necessarily, or not simply, to join with the apologists in framing 
this form of heterosexuality as the object of Milton’s critique.14 It is to reframe the 
poem itself as an open-ended exploration of multiple forms of sexuality – a queer 
exploration because it entertains the disjunction of sexual desire from the divine 
prescriptions and narrative teleology that ostensibly govern it. Queer, here, does 
not simply mean non-normative, nor can it be divorced from perversions of sex 
and gender.15 Queerness tracks anti-heteronormative modes of desire, 
embodiment, and affect. The queer readings in this issue of Early Modern Culture 
thereby extend previous lines of inquiry – many of them feminist, a few explicitly 
gay or queer – into the unstable formations of gender and sexuality in Milton’s 
work. I have implicitly drawn, for instance, on the long critical conversation about 
Eve’s poolside dalliance that includes James Holstun’s reading of it as a 







Writing in 1987, slightly before the queer turn in Early Modern Studies, Holstun 
does not use the word queer, but the word nonetheless accommodates his claim 
that Adam and Eve’s relationship “registers [lesbianism’s] continuing repressed 
presence.”17 Same-sex attraction is also the object of the first (I think) markedly 
queer reading of Milton: Gregory Bredbeck’s argument that Paradise Regain’d 
declines an easy exegetical opportunity to condemn sodomy and admits desire’s 
homoerotic pull through Satan’s temptation of the Son with “Tall stripling youths” 
(2.352).18 More of this past work is worth surveying for the sake of beginning to 
chart the genealogy of queer Milton criticism to which this issue makes a sustained 
contribution. Of course, this chart will be incomplete, even as the essays that 
follow supplement it with their own critical engagements.  
Miltonic queerness qua homoeroticism is not confined to the two epics. 
Some of Milton’s early work addresses male same-sex desire, too. Focusing on the 
“unexpressive nuptiall Song” (176) heard by the sinking Lycidas, Bruce Boehrer 
has read Milton’s poem about Edward King as a homoerotic epithalamion.19 In an 
essay entitled “Milton’s Queer Choice,” Ross Leasure has argued that the libertine 
god presents as much of a sexual threat to the brothers as to the Lady.20 Milton’s 
friendship with Charles Diodati has also attracted considerable biographical 
speculation. The friendship prompted verse that, according to Milton, was an 
inadequate form of conveyance for the intensity of his love:  
 
Carmine scire velis quâm te redamémque colámque, 
Crede mihi vix hoc carmine scire queas. 
Nam neque noster amor modulis includitur arctis, 
Nec venit ad claudos integer ipse pedes. (“Elegia sexta,” 5-8)  
 
[If you do want to learn through my verse how warmly I 
love you, how dearly I cherish you, that, believe me, you 
won’t learn through this song, for my love cannot be bound 
in tight-fitting metrics, and, being healthy, does not come to 
you on limping elegiac feet.]  
 
Partly on the basis of such verse, John T. Shawcross has concluded that Diodati 
was a homosexual, while Milton possessed a “latent homosexualism that was 
probably repressed consciously (as well as subconsciously) from being overt, 
except perhaps with Diodati.”21 Another recent biographer, Anna Beer, is more 
psychologically circumspect. She does not deny the homoerotic connection 
between the two men, but draws instead on scholarship about male friendship in 
the Renaissance to identify their love as one that “can provide unique intellectual 
and spiritual,” if not necessarily sexual, “fulfillment.”22 
Whether or to what extent Milton was a homosexual is a question that 
most self- identified queer critics would cast as beside the point. The awkward 
clinicalism of “latent homosexualism” should remind us that this question is an 
anachronistic one anyway. The queer point – or one of them, at least – is the more 
deconstructive one that heteroerotic and homoerotic, normative and perverse, 






the difference between themselves. One of the more familiar sites of temptation 
for this queer, deconstructive criticism, and the subject of Stephen Guy-Bray’s 
essay in this issue, is Raphael’s answer to Adam’s question in Paradise Lost about 
how angels “thir Love / Express” (8.615-16):  
 
Whatever pure thou in the body enjoy’st  
(And pure thou wert created) we enjoy 
In eminence, and obstacle find none 
Of membrane, joynt, or limb, exclusive barrs:  
Easier then Air with Air, if Spirits embrace,  
Total they mix, Union of Pure with Pure  
Desiring; nor retrain’d conveyance need  
As Flesh to mix with Flesh, or Soul with Soul. (8.622-629)  
 
This answer raises a host of questions. How “pure” are Adam and Eve, and are 
they less pure now than when they were first created? Does Raphael know how 
Adam and Eve have sex? (The conditional “whatever” suggests he may not.) Do 
Adam and Eve have sex, and what does that sex look like: is it a conjunction of 
flesh or the soul, or some combination of both?23 Is it procreative, and does 
procreation have to be the primary purpose of sex? Considering that neither the 
apparent sex of one’s partner nor monogamous commitments apparently bound 
angelic sex, and that Raphael imagines Adam and Eve possibly evolving “to Spirit” 
(5.497), is monogamous, married, heterosexual sex really the only form of human 
sexual expression the poem endorses? Considering that all the angels appear to 
humans as men, does Milton authorize us to envision heaven as a gay orgy? Do 
we need his authorization? Is Guy-Bray right to argue, as he does here, that the 
poem is at some level actually promoting sodomy, or non-reproductive sex 
between men or unsexed beings?  
In his Preface to Paradise Lost, C.S. Lewis reacted to Raphael’s description 
of angelic sex with the assurance that Milton had no homosexual agenda, although 
he certainly overstepped the boundaries of good taste:  
 
The trouble is, I think, that since these exalted creatures are 
all spoken of by masculine pronouns, we tend, half 
consciously, to think that Milton is attributing to them a life 
of homosexual promiscuity. That he was poetically 
imprudent in raising a matter which invites such a 
misconception I do not deny; but the real meaning is 
certainly not filthy, and certainly not foolish. As angels do 
not die, they need not breed. They are therefore not sexed 
in the human sense at all. An Angel is, of course, always He 
(not She) in human language, because whether the male is, 
or is not, the superior sex, the masculine is certainly the 








This misogynistic defense of Milton’s hetero credentials (“the masculine is 
certainly the superior gender”) hardly resolves the erotic possibilities that 
Raphael’s account of angelic sex presents. Helping set the ideologically stabilizing 
agenda of what Herman describes as the dominant paradigm of Milton criticism 
now exemplified by Stanley Fish’s argument that the poem disciplines its reader’s 
errors, Lewis insists on a “real meaning” that forecloses the queer (filthy, foolish) 
one Guy-Bray perceives. Guy-Bray is not alone in his perverse reading, however, 
nor, as the queer version of Milton’s one just man, would he necessarily be wrong 
if he were. Jonathan Goldberg has read Raphael’s account of angelic sex as 
“undeniably homo” – and “where likeness is sameness,” where “the hierarchies 
that rank angels . . . are completely absent.”25 Looking to the future, Raphael’s 
account also anticipates a time when, according to Goldberg, “all will be all and 
differences will no longer obtain.”26 I would add only that the “perhaps” and 
“may” in Raphael’s evolutionary forecast (“perhaps / Your bodies may at last turn 
all to Spirit” [5.496- 97]) suggest the limits of the angel’s knowledge about divine 
will and the nature of human beings, including human sexuality. The angel might 
be wrong about human evolution, as well as about the differences that divide male 
and female. He might be wrong that Eve is “Less excellent” (8.566) than Adam. 
By Raphael’s own patriarchal standards that place men on top, the sex Adam and 
Eve are already having may already be homo – a mutual mixture of selves that is, 
when measured against the angel’s prescription, queer.  
In a recent article, Karma deGruy follows Goldberg in arguing for the 
need to critically displace human bodies – caught between the fallen binaries of 
male and female, superior and inferior – from the center of the poem’s focus on 
gender and sexuality. By “rescuing erotic desire from the realm of the fallen and 
fleshy” through the model of the angels, deGruy maintains, “Milton does go some 
way toward . . . envision[ing] a world in which the ‘female’ and the ‘fleshly’ are 
perhaps not always locked into a hierarchically inferior position relative to the 
‘male’ and the ‘spiritual’[.]”27 For our purposes here, DeGruy’s summary finding 
that for Milton “paradise meant possibility,” coupled with Guy-Bray’s argument 
that the poem promotes sodomy, implies yet another justification for queering 
Milton beyond the imaginative recovery of prelapsarian and angelic erotic 
possibilities.28 Linking poetic envisioning to more “practical” enactment, queer 
Milton criticism may also work to resist the postlapsarian consignment of these 
possibilities to the realm of the lost. Queer Milton criticism, that is, may locate 
Paradise Lost and Milton’s other work in a class of Renaissance texts that James 
Bromley argues foreground “failures of intimacy” – failures to the extent that their 
instructions about how to desire do not coalesce around the monogamous, 
heterosexual couple. “Empowering readers to reimagine their own erotic lives,” 
Bromley contends, many Renaissance “literary texts offer a counterdiscourse to 
the period’s marital advice and conduct books and other texts that attempt to 
naturalize the consolidation of intimacy around monogamous coupling.” Crucial 
for the purpose of extending this thesis to Milton’s work is Bromley’s claim that 
this “counterdiscourse is present even when texts ostensibly demonize alternative 
forms of intimacy, as a greater flexibility in Renaissance narrative allowed readers 






practices.”29 Throughout his poetry and his prose, Milton contends with 
competing discourses of erotic intimacy that the reader, both Renaissance and 
modern, can seize upon to resist the sex education lesson ostensibly proffered. 
Queers, after all, have long had to resist sex education programs that demonize 
their forms of erotic life, that associate these forms of life with depression, suicide, 
disease, and, of course, a violation of God’s will.  
Read for its counterdiscourses of intimacy, Paradise Lost becomes a poem 
that, at times the reader may choose to privilege, celebrates non-monogamous 
erotic encounters between multiple unsexed or all-male beings. It allows that 
Adam and Eve’s relationship might have been a truly egalitarian one rather than 
an alternatively brutal and gently misogynistic one. And, to be sure, it allows that 
their relationship may still be such an egalitarian one – that “hand in hand” 
(12.648) equality may lie in their future as well.30 It allows, too, that Adam might 
have been happier in Eden with Steve rather than Eve, and asks the reader to 
consider whether this homoerotic desire is necessarily tethered to a 
misunderstanding of sexual difference. It imagines an Eve who, no inferior to 
Adam, also might have been happier with another woman, if not alone with 
herself. It imagines sex, lots of it, and lots of different kinds of it, and not all of it, 
or any of it, procreative. And it rejects all attempts to foreclose these possibilities 
as efforts to “straighten out” a poem whose pleasures result from its indulgence 
in and entertainment of desires it does not succeed in disciplining.  
Uninfluenced by this introduction, the essays that follow take their own 
solitary yet still companionate queer ways. In “‘Fellowships of Joy’: Angelic Union 
in Paradise Lost,” the essay I already previewed the most here, Stephen Guy-Bray 
argues that Milton’s poem privileges not reproductive heterosexuality, which is 
associated with Satan, Sin and Death, but rather “an unreproductive and ultimately 
ungendered sexuality that we can only call queer.” For Guy-Bray, Milton’s 
representation of angelic sex develops the Renaissance discourse of male 
friendship as the highest form of affective bonding – a discourse also structuring 
the poem’s long conversation between Adam and Raphael. Marriage between men 
and women is at best a metaphorical approximation of this more perfect form of 
same-sex union, which, in the period, is also recognizable as sodomy. Guy-Bray’s 
method of queering Milton is thus, in part, one of inversion: transforming the poet 
into a proponent of a form of sexuality widely regarded as sinful, and remaking 
Milton as a poet who himself reinvents sin as the most perfect form of sexual 
expression.  
In “Eros and Anteros: Queer Mutuality in Milton’s Doctrine and Discipline 
of Divorce,” David Orvis directly challenges the assumption, upon which I relied at 
the beginning of this introduction, that same-sex friendship provides Milton with 
the model of relationality that underwrites an ideal heterosexual marriage. Orvis 
argues that Milton’s Anteros does not represent friendship, as critics have 
traditionally interpreted him; nor is Anteros simply identical to, or distinct from, 
Eros. As Orvis traces the relationship between Eros and Anteros from classical to 
modern culture, he finds it tangled up in a confusion of mistaken identities and 
allegorical and anti-allegorical readings. Drawing on a formulation of queerness as 







this confusion to configure marriage as a potential threat to a form of love that 
has no name – a love whose queerness lies in its ineffability, in the fact that it can 
only be defined by what it is not.  
Instead of turning Milton into a champion of queerness, the next two 
essays take seriously Milton’s hostility to the queer – queering Milton by exploring, 
in the first case, his flight from rationality in his defense of chastity, and in the 
second case, his hero’s provoking resemblance to the queer enemy. In “‘What 
Hath Night to Do with Sleep?’: Bestial Sex and Human Temporality in A Mask,” 
Melissa Sanchez draws on recent conversations about queer time (the relationship 
of queerness to chronological time and narratives of human development), as well 
as recent conversations in animal studies, to claim that the boundary between 
human and animal in A Mask is one of temporality, not ontology. Comus tempts 
the Lady with pleasure now – a pleasure she resists, and a temptation she endures, 
in the name of a marital chastity that preserves her humanity and prevents her 
transformation into a beast. Yet the Lady does not clearly win her argument with 
Comus, as the brothers interrupt the argument with their bungled rescue attempt. 
Chastity’s ultimate defense, Sanchez deduces, lies beyond reason, in spiritual aid 
figured in the forms of Sabrina and the Attendant Spirit. This aid, in turn, undoes 
the very distinctions between human reason and animalistic passion underwriting 
the Lady’s defense of chastity.  
Drew Daniel’s concluding essay, “Dagon as Queer Assemblage: 
Effeminacy and Terror in Samson Agonistes,” enters the fray about Milton’s 
endorsement of religious terrorism to posit that a resemblance between Samson 
as an emasculated male and Dagon as a monstrous hybrid or “queer assemblage” 
provokes Samson’s razing of the Philistine temple. An expansive and meditative 
essay that weaves together Jasbir Puar’s work on terrorism and early modernist 
work on effeminacy, “Dagon as Queer Assemblage” attends to the negative affects 
of shame and anxiety that most frequently characterize Milton’s attitude toward 
queer sexualities and toward sodomy in particular. Evidence for Milton’s anxious 
aversion to sodomy appears in his prose, where he further links it to forms of 
monstrous hybridity that Dagon materializes. (Whereas Guy-Bray’s Milton 
“endorses” sodomy as non-reproductive sex, Daniel’s Milton characterizes 
sodomy as frighteningly, demonically reproductive.) In a section on “the clash of 
civilizations” between Milton and queer studies, Daniel suggests that analyzing the 
manifestations and effects of this anxiety, including anxiety’s transformation into 
terror, should be one objective of a queer Milton studies that seeks to do more 
than recover positive representations of homoerotic and other non-
heteronormative relations.  
Justifying queer ways of reading Milton, the essays that follow 
demonstrate particular analytical purchases the concept of queerness can make on 
just some recurrent questions in Milton studies. What forms does sex take among 
the angels and among humans before the fall? What is the relationship between 
friendship and marriage? What does Milton mean by chastity? Does Samson 
Agonistes endorse religious terrorism? Attending to these questions leads to 
dalliances with others. Is Milton’s Christianity hostile to queer expression? Is it the 






Milton Studies been so far relatively unaffected by the queer turn in Early Modern 
(especially Shakespeare) Studies? It is no accident, perhaps, that the five early 
modernists who collaborate here to raise questions about Milton’s queerness are 
not, like our respondent Victoria Silver, principally Miltonists. For within Early 
Modern Studies, to twist Satan’s famous observation, Milton Studies is its own 
place. For many of those on the inside, it is a heaven of devotees to the most 
profound English poet of the seventeenth century. For many of those on the 
outside, it is a hell of ideological conservatives who have made a career out of 
committing the intentional fallacy.31 Whether Milton Studies remains such a 
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